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Abstract
Classical Islamic scholarship developed two principal theses on the subject of the ori-
gin of language (aṣl al-lugha). The first of these theses, commonly referred to as tawqīf, 
accentuated the pre-eminent role that divine agency played in the imposition of lan-
guage; axiomatic within this perspective is the view that words (lafẓ pl. alfāẓ) have 
been assigned their meanings (maʿnā pl. maʿānī) primordially by God. Presented as 
something of an antithesis to this position, the second doctrine, labeled iṣṭilāḥ, predi-
cates that language was established and evolved via a process of common convention 
and agreement: words together with their meanings were assigned by human beings, 
although both the doctrines of tawqīf and iṣṭilāḥ posit that the actual relationship 
between words and their assigned meanings remains entirely arbitrary, rejecting any 
sort of natural link between the two. Although later Islamic scholarship accepted that 
both theses were plausible, within the course of the 9th/10th centuries opinions on the 
subject were ostensibly polarized between orthodox and arch-rationalist camps with 
the former endorsing tawqīf and the latter iṣṭilāḥ. In the quest to achieve a conceptual 
defense of traditional arguments for tawqīf it was necessary for orthodox theologians 
to create a connective structure, as articulated through reference to remembrance, 
continuation, and identity, which enabled them to anchor the construct of tawqīf  in a 
formalized way to the scriptural exegesis and emblems of orthodoxy associated with 
the pious ancestors. That this was successfully accomplished through references to the 
past would seem to confirm the role which cultural memory played in the defense of 
what was deemed an orthodox belief.
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Introduction
Classical Islamic scholarship developed two principal theses on the sub-
ject of the origin of language (aṣl al-lugha). The first of these theses, 
commonly referred to as tawqīf, accentuated the pre-eminent role 
which divine agency played in the imposition of language; axiomatic 
within this perspective is the view that words had been primordially 
assigned meanings by God. The modality of this process of positing is 
never fully qualified, although it is hypothesized that God created a 
necessarily intuitive knowledge which encompassed words and their 
assigned meanings. Presented as an antithesis to this concept, the sec-
ond thesis, labeled iṣṭilāḥ, predicates that language was established via 
common convention and agreement (muwāḍaʿa) by humans who 
assigned communicative meaning to words. Both the doctrines of 
tawqīf and iṣṭilāḥ deem that the original formation of the connection 
between words and their meanings remains entirely arbitrary (Suyūṭī 
1970:I, 1–60). There does not exist an absolute affinity between the 
distinctive phonemic properties of the Arabic word for “book,” kitāb, 
and the physical object it signifies. Indeed, it would have been entirely 
conceivable for the inventor of language to choose an alternative com-
bination of phonemes to denote “kitāb.” The terms revelationist and 
conventionalist are frequently used to signify the respective tawqīf and 
iṣṭilāḥ theses. Recent scholarship has identified an intricate range of 
theological exigencies and concerns which were driving the early debates 
on the origins of language, arguing that the thesis of iṣṭilāh ̣ was gener-
ated within the course of such discussions. It is also reckoned that, 
concomitantly, tawqīf, despite having tentative roots in early exegetical 
musings, appears in a much more developed sense as a significant coun-
terargument adduced to challenge and undermine iṣṭilāh ̣ and the range 
of theological doctrines aligned with it. 
Initially, elements within orthodox Islamic circles tended to endorse 
the thesis of tawqīf, despite the fact that a number of its advocates were 
individuals not necessarily renowned for their orthodox inclination. 
Gradually, as the theological trajectories of the discourse evolved, both 
theses were recognized as being equally plausible; indeed, some scholars 
even adapted elaborate explanations of the origins of language which 
fused peculiar aspects of the two doctrines (Zarkashī 1992:II, 14–16). 
Nevertheless, in the course of the 9th/10th centuries and for a period 
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beyond, opinions on the subject were more or less entrenched and 
indicative of an underlying theological tension between traditionalists 
and arch-rationalists. And, in the quest to achieve a conceptual defense 
of traditional arguments for tawqīf, it was necessary for orthodox theo-
logians to create a connective structure, as articulated through reference 
to “remembrance,” “continuation,” and “identity,” which enabled them 
to anchor the construct of tawqīf in a formalized way to the scriptural 
exegesis and emblems of orthodoxy associated with the pious ancestors. 
That this reconstruction was successfully accomplished through refer-
ences to the past would seem to confirm the measured role which cul-
tural memory played in the defense of an orthodox idea. 
Historical contexts
Classical Muslim sources referring to the discussion of the origins of 
language frequently affirm that the doctrine of iṣṭilāh ̣ was first intro-
duced by Abū Hāshim ibn al-Jubbāʾī (d. 933), a distinguished theolo-
gian. His father, al-Jubbāʾī (d. 915), was one of the outstanding members 
of the Basran Muʿtazilites, a theological movement which had its his-
torical roots in the early Islamic tradition. The Muʿtazilites were renowned 
for upholding the critical role that human reason should play in the 
synthesis of faith, importing rationally based arguments and premises 
to define and defend their doctrinal stances. The Muʿtazilites insisted 
that God always acted in accordance with the dictates of reason (ʿaql ), 
which, in their view, had to serve as the principal criterion and arbiter 
of truth; they assimilated Greek philosophical arguments and con-
structs which had gradually pervaded the intellectual discourses of the 
Islamic world through a steady stream of translations into Arabic via 
Syriac. They referred to themselves as the upholders of “divine unity 
and justice,” promoting two key axioms. Firstly, they defended the 
notion of God’s absolute transcendence, dismissing any attempt to 
conceptualize or refer to the divine essence in an anthropomorphic way. 
Additionally, they argued that God’s attributes, as predicated in the 
scriptural sources, were an intrinsic part of his essence in the sense that 
God knows not by a hypostatic entity of knowledge which subsists 
within his essence, but by virtue of his unique essence; these attributes 
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were identical with His essence; they were identical with Him (Mānkdīm 
1965:182–3 cf. Juwaynī 1996:51–5). Within orthodoxy these attributes, 
among which is the attribute of speech (kalām), were viewed in a sub-
stantial and essential vein. The Muʿtazilites contended that such a view 
implied the existence of a plurality within the Godhead, compromising 
the conception of the divine unity of God. Secondly, they trenchantly 
rejected the orthodox doctrine of predestination, insisting that God’s 
divine justice together with the prerequisites of moral and religious obli-
gation entailed that human beings had to be free and responsible agents 
who were the sole authors of their acts.
In stressing the axiom of God’s transcendence, the Muʿtazilites argued 
that the sacred scripture of Islam, the Qurʾān, was a created and tempo-
rally contingent document; there was a time when it did not exist. The 
traditional belief predicated that the Qurʾān was the uncreated and 
essential speech of God (kalām Allāh) as revealed to his Prophet by the 
angel Gabriel and that to speak of the Qurʾān in terms of its being cre-
ated compromised this exceptional quality. Some staunchly traditional-
ist theologians had claimed the Qurʾān was eternal (qadīm) and 
uncreated in status and that the attribute of speech together with its 
physical expression (lafẓ) as a recited text was actually coordinate with 
the divine essence; others had simply emphasized its entitative and con-
comitant status within the divine essence (Juwaynī 1996:128–9). 
But for the Muʿtazilites, to refer to God as a speaker in any sort of 
literal context was tantamount to anthropomorphism and also implied 
that He possessed a physical organ with which words were articulated 
(Madelung 1974:507). It would have been argued from an ontological 
perspective, that such an understanding contradicted the nature of 
God’s transcendence and the reality that the divine essence could not 
serve as a locus or substrate for contingent acts such as speech or indeed 
even physical movement. During the period referred to as the miḥna 
(“Inquisition”), when the political influence of the Muʿtazilites was 
dominant, the doctrine of a created Qurʾān was imposed as the official 
policy of the ʿAbbasid state by the caliph al-Maʾmūn (ruled 813–33). It 
was vigorously opposed by traditionalist scholars, who were in some 
cases compelled to recant the doctrine of an uncreated Qurʾān. 
Historically, al-Jubbāʾī was closely associated with Abūʾ l-Hạsan 
al-Ashʿarī (d. 935), the eponym of Sunni orthodoxy’s most prominent 
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school of scholastic theology, the Ashʿarites.1 Doctrinal disagreements 
between these two cynosures led to al-Ashʿarī denouncing the Muʿtazilites, 
and subsequently devoting his life to refuting their theological teach-
ings and arguments. While differences persist as to whether the brand 
of orthodoxy which became synonymous with later Ashʿarite thinkers 
has its roots in the legacy of al-Ashʿarī, it was purposefully constellated 
around a rationally based traditionalist methodology and strategy to 
counter Muʿtazilism (Frank 1991:143–9; Makdisi 1962:37–41). One 
tension in medieval Islamic thought is the opposition between tradi-
tionalists on the one hand, who abhorred the use of speculatively based 
rational tools for the defense of orthodoxy, and, on the other hand, the 
Ashʿarites, who were content to utilize such rational approaches and 
procedures when mounting a defense of orthodoxy. This was not merely 
an issue of methodology and approaches; rather, there were key points 
of dogma which inexorably separated the traditionalists, especially 
those with conservative outlooks, from the Ashʿarites. Despite the 
opprobrium of the staunch traditionalists, rationally inspired approaches 
to the defense of religious dogma became an indelible feature of classi-
cal Islamic theological discourse. The thematic compass of theology 
extended to a gamut of subjects: it was concerned not only with the 
articulation of traditional beliefs, but it also took to expanding con-
structs of dogma which were the product of dialectical discussions and 
debates (Shah 2007:432–5). This sometimes entailed the controversial 
use of apophatic and cataphatic forms of argumentation and, moreover, 
reference to teleological and cosmological arguments (Āmidī 2004 
passim). The accusation that the Ashʿarites were tainted through their 
promoting a brand of Muʿtazilism masquerading as orthodoxy fre-
quently resonates in the classical theological literature. Nonetheless, 
this should not detract from the fact that the opposition between the 
Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites forms a fecund chapter in classical theo-
logical thought. Much of the discussion about the origins of language 
was inspired by the intellectual milieu of deliberations between the 
1) The brand of orthodox scholastic theology cultivated by Ashʿarī had its antecedents: 
figures such as Ibn Kullāb (d. 854), al-Qalānisī (fl. 9th century), and al-Muhāsibī 
(d. 857) were linked with adopting similar strategies in the defence of orthodoxy. 
Ibn Kullāb’s followers were identified with a separate school (Kullābiyya).
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Muʿtazilites and the Ashʿarites, although contributions to the debate 
came from other quarters within the religious tradition. In the related 
literature references to the origin of language often appear to be a 
peripheral feature of theological and legal discourses, although the dis-
cussions had profound ramifications for a number of contentiously 
debated topics, including the doctrine of the divine names, arguments 
about the imposition of religious obligation, theological references to 
metaphor and figurative language, and, to an extent, the concept of a 
created Qurʾān. 
Following a period of gestation, the Muʿtazilites divided into two 
nominal camps: the Basrans and the Baghdādīs, although the indige-
nous influence of these camps extended across different parts of the 
Islamic world (Van Ess 1987:6320; Watt 1998:217–50). In the Basran 
camp were figures such as Ḍirār ibn ʿ Amr (d. 915), Abū Bakr al-Aṣamm 
(d. 816), Abū ʾl-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 841), al-Naẓẓām (d. 836), 
Muʿammar ibn ʿAbbād (d. 830), Hishām ibn ʿAmr al-Fuwaṭī (d. 842), 
al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 869), and ʿAbbād ibn Sulaymān (d. 864). The Baghdādīs 
included among their ranks Bishr ibn al-Muʿtamir (d. 825 or 840), 
Thumāma ibn Ashras al-Numayrī (d. 828), Jaʿfar ibn Hạrb (d. 850), 
and other notable individuals. Despite the existence of differences on 
specific points of doctrine among these figures, the underlying princi-
ples of “divine unity and justice” and the doctrine of the created Qurʾān 
were key shibboleths of Muʿtazilism; and significantly, the whole 
dynamic of this movement’s thought was incontrovertibly driven by a 
rationally inspired synthesis of dogmatic and dialectical constructs. 
Arguments for tawqīf and iṣṭilāḥ
During the chronological era in which Abū Hāshim lived, the move-
ment associated with the Muʿtazilites had relinquished much of its 
political influence, but continued to develop theoretical ideas and solu-
tions to various theological quandaries and related discussions through-
out the ensuing historical periods. Despite the fact that none of Abū 
Hāshim’s oeuvre has survived, a range of dicta and reports attributed to 
this figure and others on the subject of tawqīf and iṣṭilāh ̣ is preserved in 
theological, philological, exegetical, and legal literature, particularly 
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those texts devoted to the principles of jurisprudence in which scholars 
pored over the epistemological preliminaries of language as a prelude to 
defining the theoretical bases of law. By virtue of these materials it is 
possible to gauge the various arguments and counter-arguments which 
surface in discussions relating to the origins of language. There is scant 
evidence to show that the concept of iṣṭilāh ̣ was articulated before being 
championed by Abū Hāshim.2 Critically, once the concept of iṣṭilāh ̣ 
was proposed, it appears to have been immediately countered with the 
thesis of tawqīf by Abū Hāshim’s father, al-Jubbāʾī, Abū ʾl-Qāsim 
(al-Balkhī) al-Kaʿbī (d. 932), a renowned Muʿtazilite of the Baghdādī 
school, and Abū ʾl-Hạsan al-Ashʿarī (Naysābūrī 1979:158). 
The earliest extant Muʿtazilite theological sources which feature a 
detailed treatment of the issue are the writings of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
(d. 1025), a trenchant defender of Muʿtazilism in whose works is pre-
served much of this school’s thought from the formative periods. Among 
his most important work is the Kitāb al-mughnī, a voluminous text which 
covers a grand collection of theological subjects. The followers of Abū 
Hāshim are referred to in the sources as the Bahshamiyya, representing 
the predominant branch of the school in the 10th and 11th centuries. 
The suggestion is that its brand of theology purportedly dominated the 
related discourse among Muʿtazilites in these periods (Isfarāyīnī 1985:74). 
ʿAbd al-Jabbār and many of his immediate students were enumerated 
among the ranks of the Bahshamiyya. It is also clear from the contexts in 
which Abū Hāshim is cited in the literature that, although isṭịlāh ̣appears 
as his doctrinal innovation, there are other markedly significant theologi-
cal concepts which he introduces and propounds upon, underlining his 
reputation as an immensely influential thinker.3
The analysis of the topics of iṣṭilāḥ and muwāḍaʿa features at a num-
ber of junctures in the Kitāb al-mughnī, but in a chapter devoted to a 
discussion of the names and attributes of God ʿAbd al-Jabbār broaches 
the premise that initially a name (ism) can represent only its named 
entity or referent (al-musammā) by way of meaningful designation and 
purpose (qaṣd wa-irāda) (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1965:V, 160–5). He argues 
2) Richard Frank does mention that muwāḍaʿa was introduced by Ibn al-Rāwandī 
(d. 859); Frank 1978:29.
3) This would include his famous theory of hypostatic states (aḥwāl ), which dealt with 
the nature of the divine essence.
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that through common convention and agreement entities are assigned 
names but it is the very act of qaṣd, that is to say, divulging the design 
and intended purpose of naming, which primarily validates the con-
nection between a name and its referent. Through a labyrinth of argu-
ments in which Abū Hāshim is often cited, it is postulated that without 
a necessary awareness of qaṣd among interlocutors, no process of 
muwāḍaʿa is possible. The general thrust of this rationale would be that 
if language had been established initially via tawqīf, with God’s invent-
ing language and establishing the relationship between words and 
meanings, then he would have had to reveal necessarily the design and 
intention behind the use of language. This would entail disclosing to 
humans knowledge of God before the actual imposition of religious 
obligation. ʿAbd al-Jabbār insists “It is inconceivable that we should 
necessarily know God’s intention in the state of obligation, just as it 
would be inappropriate to know necessarily His essence at the time 
when obligation comes into existence” (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1965:V, 164; 
Rāzī 1981:I, 191). The reasoning is that knowledge of the attribute of 
an entity, in this case God’s imposition of language, would a fortiori 
necessitate knowledge of the essence of that entity, namely God (Asnawī 
1999:I, 189). Muʿtazilites insisted that a human being’s first duty was 
to recognize God through rational contemplation: it was not possible 
to witness God in the physical sense, nor can He be known in an inev-
itably necessary way (Mānkdīm 1965:44; cf. Juwaynī 1969:110). It was 
incumbent upon individuals of sound mind to seek to acquire knowl-
edge of God. Referring to Abū Hāshim’s arguments, ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
argues that if humans were acquainted with God’s qaṣd, then taklīf, the 
act of imposing religious obligation, would be rendered utterly futile.4 
From a separate perspective, ʿ Abd al-Jabbār contends that preceding the 
process of muwāḍaʿa, in which words are assigned meanings, were 
observable acts of gesticulation. These acts permit the specification and 
designation of the thing named (al-musammā); unsurprisingly, by infer-
ence God could not possibly be associated with the physical movement
4) Ashʿarite theologians argued that religious obligations could only be realised follow-
ing revelation (Juwaynī 1969:115). With respect to ‘meaning’, de Saussure spoke of 
the arbitrary nature of the relationship between the signifiant (concept) and the sig-
nifié (sound image). 
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concomitant with such acts (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1965:164). Now, ʿAbd 
al-Jabbār does concede that it is possible for tawqīf to occur in respect 
of the genesis of succeeding languages, but this would occur only once 
an initial language had been established via muwāḍaʿa by humans (ʿAbd 
al-Jabbār 1965:V, 164–6; cf. Peters 1976:386–7).
In a later text entitled al-Masāʾil fī’l-khilāf composed by one of ʿAbd 
al-Jabbār’s students, Abū Rashīd al-Naysabūrī (d. 1068), in which doc-
trinal differences between Basran and Baghdādī Muʿtazilites are enu-
merated, Abū Hāshim is identified as the author of the idea that the 
origin of language lies in muwāḍaʿa (iṣṭilāh ̣). Abū Rashīd maintains that 
Abū ʾl-Qāsim al-Balkhī professed the doctrine of tawqīf, while, con-
versely, al-Jubbāʾī is purported to have recognized that both the doc-
trines of tawqīf and iṣṭilāḥ offered plausible explanations for the origin 
of language. Abū Rashīd then moves on to defend the doctrinal posi-
tion taken by Abū Hāshim, using similar arguments about qaṣd and 
taklīf (Naysābūrī 1979:158). Later sources provide further anecdotal 
evidence of the arguments employed by Abū Hāshim to justify iṣṭilāh ̣ 
(Asnawī 1999:I, 188). One such example is his contention that the 
human designation of language must precede the advent of revelation. 
A Qurʾanic verse to that effect is cited, Q 14:4: “And never did we dis-
patch a Prophet except that he conversed in the language of those to 
whom he was sent in order to make (matters) plain for them.” Abū 
Hāshim is said to have retorted that the alternative would be for God 
to instill a necessary and intuitive knowledge of language in the mind 
of an intelligent individual. However, he adds that such an act would 
necessitate this individual spontaneously recognizing God, rendering 
futile the concept of religious obligation, taklīf (cf. Asnawī 1999:I, 
188). Ex hypothesi, a conventionally derived language has to be in place 
before the advent of revelation (Versteegh 1996b:25).
The key figure who is identified as an opponent of iṣṭilāh ̣ and the 
defender of the thesis of tawqīf, al-Ashʿarī, is reported to have been a 
prolific author of works, but only a small number of these is extant and 
no discussion of the thesis of tawqīf is found in these texts (Ibn ʿAsākir 
1982:140). The basic theological arguments for tawqīf attributed to 
al-Ashʿarī are preserved in the literature of later Ashʿarite luminaries. 
One such work is the Mujarrad maqālāt al-shaykh Abī ʾ l-Hạsan al-Ashʿarī 
(“The essential theological doctrines of Al-Ashʿarī”) composed by one 
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of the school’s acolytes, Ibn Fūrak (d. 1015), and this presents a synop-
tic survey of the theological doctrines professed by al-Ashʿarī. In this 
work Ibn Fūrak confirms that al-Ashʿarī was of the opinion that all 
languages were established via tawqīf. He also refers to his having 
adduced the argument of infinite regress to dismiss iṣṭilāh ̣ on the basis 
that every stage of positing the communicative meaning of language 
would necessarily require a preceding phase of muwāḍaʿa ad infinitum: 
that this is reductive means that the only plausible explanation for the 
origin of language was that supplied by tawqīf. Ibn Fūrak contends that 
while al-Ashʿarī accepted that the very roots of language were estab-
lished via tawqīf, he conceded that some of the branches of languages 
could be determined by a process of analogy and applied endeavor 
(ijtihād ). 
Further implications of the discussions on tawqīf and iṣṭilāh ̣ become 
apparent when Ibn Fūrak reveals that al-Ashʿarī maintained that the 
divine names of God and His attributes can be determined only by way 
of tawqīf: namely, on the basis of divine instruction and decree, and 
that this sort of designation had to be referenced to authenticated scrip-
tural sources such as the Qurʾān and the Prophetic traditions, or indeed 
community consensus (Ibn Fūrak 1987:42). Offering a synopsis of 
Ashʿarite doctrine, the 10th century theologian al-Baghdādī discloses 
that the Basran Muʿtazilites professed the belief that the names of God 
were derived through a process of iṣṭilāḥ and qiyās (analogical reason-
ing), adding that the Sunnites (Ashʿarites) believed that these divine 
names had been determined by virtue of tawqīf (Baghdādī, 1928:116; 
cf. Jurjānī 1998:VII, 232–4). In this context it seems evident that defer-
ence to tawqīf was one way of countering the Basran arguments regard-
ing the etymology of the divine names; in his critique of the Basran 
Muʿtazilites’ position on the divine names Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064), a figure 
associated with a stricter form of orthodoxy, adopts a similar strategy in 
terms of invoking tawqīf (Ibn Hạzm 1985:II, 345–6).
The differences between Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites on the issue of 
the divine names emanate from al-Jubbāʾī’s argument that it was pos-
sible to designate these names by way of analogy. Yet, the tawqīf-iṣṭilāh ̣ 
antithesis in respect of the origin of language had little to do with 
al-Jubbāʾī’s stance on this issue for he subscribed to the view that both 
tawqīf and iṣṭilāh ̣ were equally plausible theses: thus conceptually, 
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neither of them would appear to impinge upon his theory apropos the 
divine names (Frank 1978:29; Vasalou 2009:210–2). Still, it has been 
argued that the debate on this issue was boldly taken a stage further by 
Abū Hāshim who created the construct of iṣṭilāh ̣ to consolidate the 
arguments for designating divine names by way of analogy (Gimaret 
1988:37–50; Vasalou 2009:201–3). From a broader perspective, accord-
ing to the Muʿtazilite concept of divine unity (tawh ̣īd ), the substantive 
names and attributes associated with God were identical with him, but 
did not essentially inhere in God’s essence in an entitative or hypostatic 
sense. It would have been argued that initially God had neither name 
nor attributes: these were created and designated at a later point in 
time. This whole discussion is related to the idea that there did not 
exist a unity of identity between names (asmāʾ) and the referents 
or entities (musammā) which they signified, but rather they were a 
product of the process of naming (tasmiyya) (Bāqillānī 1993:258; 
Versteegh 1977:156–61; Burrell and Daher 2004:4–9). Ashʿarites rec-
ognized that a number of these names and attributes were essential, 
existing hypostatically within God’s essence; they also took the position 
that there existed a unity of identity between the name and the thing 
named (nomen and nominatum): in their view the names and attributes 
manifestly reflected, ontological realities of the divine essence, embody-
ing the qualities defined by their referents (al-Ashʿarī 1990:345; 
Bāqillānī 1993:258; cf. Ghazālī 2006:9–21). Conversely, by jockeying 
for position on the etymology of the divine names and appealing to 
iṣṭilāḥ, the Muʿtazilites could undermine the Ashʿarite arguments about 
the nature of the divine essence. 
Interestingly, Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī’s al-Masāʾil includes a section 
which discusses the subject of “changing assigned names,” stating that 
al-Kaʿbī rejected that this was possible except by virtue of revelation 
(waḥy). He referred to such changes as having the potential to create 
ambiguity for those under religious obligation (al-mukallaf ). But being 
faithful to his Bahshamiyya allegiances, Abū Rashīd pronounces that 
such a convention is acceptable if it has a sound purpose, citing the 
innovative scheme of terminology applied to the metrification of poetry 
by Khalīl ibn Aḥmad (d. 791) (Naysābūrī 1979:161). Thus it would 
seem that the arguments about iṣṭilāḥ favored by the Bahshamiyya were 
theoretically derived constructs conceived to promote the wider aim of 
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a theory about God’s divine names, although whether iṣṭilāh ̣ was abso-
lutely critical to the concatenation of arguments adduced in this respect 
remains somewhat vague; this is due to the fact that a number of prom-
inent Muʿtazilīte scholars were enthusiastic advocates of tawqīf. But the 
thesis of iṣṭilāḥ was also relevant to arguments about religious obliga-
tions, the created status of the Qurʾān, the incidence of metaphor along 
with its theological import and even the idea that the acceptance of 
iṣṭilāḥ would allow changes to the meaning of religious conventions 
and precedents (Asnawī 1999:I, 186). To deal with this cogent array of 
theological challenges, some of which were deemed proportionately 
graver than others, the proponents of orthodoxy had to come up with 
a robust defense which could engage with the rational arguments pro-
pounded by their opponents but, more significantly, also appeal to 
decisive scriptural proofs. 
The arguments among advocates of tawqīf and iṣṭilāh ̣ proceeded on 
a number of bases: firstly, there was the attestation of authenticated 
scriptural proofs, adillat al-samʿ, which were chiefly Qurʾanic in prove-
nance, although it was also possible for scholars to cite an appropriate 
Prophetic dictum. The adillat al-samʿ would be separately subjected to 
resolution and explication by the opposing camps. Then, secondly, 
there were the rational arguments which dealt with demonstrating or 
challenging the plausibility of constructs; the argument and counter-
argument adduced by the respective camps often led to a circularity in 
the discussions. From a traditional perspective a number of factors 
favored those who were defenders of tawqīf. Proofs from scriptural 
sources were seemingly closer to a revelationist perspective than a con-
ventionalist one; furthermore, iṣṭilāḥ was unquestionably an innovative 
concept introduced at a posterior juncture in the history of Islamic 
thought. As the “agents of cultural memory” defenders of tawqīf could 
create a meaning from the available scriptural proofs which brought 
down the scales in favor of their thesis (cf. Assmann 2006:43). The 
additional qualifying dicta associated with the pious ancestors, which 
later scholars were able to adduce, further buttressed the case for tawqīf. 
Appealing to the authority of precedent and using the skilful juxtaposi-
tion of Qurʾanic and extra-Prophetic statements, they placed tawqīf 
firmly within the boundaries of the legacy and teachings of the pious 
ancestors, presenting the doctrine as a distinction of orthodoxy. And 
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within this context, the elementary thesis of tawqīf as derived from the 
corpus of scriptural evidences was “given enhanced normative value” 
(Assmann 2006:69). The achievement was ingenious for the advocates 
of tawqīf had identified with a derived expression of a traditional past, 
a past that would enable them to counter iṣṭilāh ̣, a perceived innova-
tion, and the range of doctrines for which it could be exploited 
(Assmann 2006:28 cf. Brunner 2005:327).
Scriptural evidence 
The Qurʾanic verse which served as the locus classicus for the advocates 
of tawqīf was Q 2:31. It states, “And indeed God taught the names 
(asmāʾ) of all existent things to Ādam; then, he showed them to the 
angels and announced ‘inform me of the names of these if you are 
truthful’.” For individuals such as the Mālikite jurist Muḥammad ibn 
Khuwazmandād (fl. 10th C) the Qurʾanic verse alone provided indubi-
table proof that language’s origin lay in tawqīf and that the names 
taught by God to Ādam encompassed the most general of existent 
things and the more specific among them (Qurṭubī 1988:I, 194). Pro-
ponents of iṣṭilāḥ did attempt to proffer interpretive glosses of these 
proofs which supported their own perspectives. However, the concom-
itant attestation of Qurʾanic verses and dicta associated with Compan-
ions and Successor figures added significant weight to the arguments 
for tawqīf. Classical exegetical literature is replete with separate reports 
emanating from distinguished authorities such as Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 687–
8), ʿIkrima (d. 723), Qatāda (d. 735), Mujāhid (d. c. 718 or 722), and 
Ibn Jubayr (d. 714) in which it is proclaimed that Ādam was taught the 
names of all things be they significant or otherwise (Ṭabarī 1969:I, 
480–6). Although not concerned with the theoretical intricacies and 
implications of the arguments about tawqīf and iṣṭilāh ̣, the scriptural 
evidence for tawqīf found in exegetical sources appeared to be over-
whelming. Still, the traditional exegetical literature also included refer-
ences to much more confined interpretations of the verse, and among 
which were statements suggesting that God had taught Ādam only the 
names of his offspring and the angels; indeed, even the renowned com-
mentator al-Ṭabarī (d. 922) veered towards this particular explanation 
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of the verse (Tạbarī 1969:I, 480–6). Despite this, such materials were 
seemingly adumbrated by proofs endorsing tawqīf. 
A number of the Qurʾanic verses adduced by the proponents of 
tawqīf are discussed in a Qurʾanic commentary by ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
devoted to defending Muʿtazilite doctrine through reference to the class 
of verses deemed theologically contentious (mutashābihāt). The text 
applies an exegesis of the Qurʾān in a way which shows that Muʿtazilite 
tenets and doctrine are commensurate with the general thrust of scrip-
ture, refuting opposing perspectives in the course of its discussions. 
Regarding Q 2:31, ʿAbd al-Jabbār dismisses the suggestion that the 
verse provides scriptural proof of the validity of the doctrine of tawqīf 
or that it undermines the idea of muwāḍaʿa (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1969:82–4 
cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1965:V, 164–6). He stresses that it implicitly reveals 
that God did indeed teach Ādam the names of all things, but the 
language which he was taught had previously been established via 
muwāḍaʿa. Abū Hashim’s arguments about qas ̣d and taklīf are promi-
nently highlighted to drive home the point. Similar points are empha-
sized by Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī, who even includes an anonymous 
statement announcing that the verse in question shows that Ādam was 
taught by God the phases of muwāḍaʿa which were at some point in the 
future going to be established by humans; it was implied that Ādam’s 
being presciently acquainted by God with this anticipated muwāḍaʿa 
could serve as a divine miracle (Naysābūrī 1979:161).
The appeal to scripture did not end there and in the numerous trea-
tises which dealt with the arguments on this topic, advocates of tawqīf 
cited further Qurʾanic verses. One of these refers to polytheists having 
invoked the names of gods whom they had themselves invented: the 
Qurʾān condemns this practice more than once: both Q 12:41 and 
Q 53:23 state, “These are merely names you and your forebears invented 
and concerning which God has provided no sanction.” The reasoning 
here is that the misguided naming and identification of such deities was 
grossly artificial and erroneous; this was an inherent indictment of 
iṣṭilāḥ, indicating that language had been revealed via tawqīf (Asnawī 
1999:I, 185–7). A further relevant verse is Q 30:22 which asserts “And 
among his signs are that he created the heavens and the earth; and (also) 
the diversity of your tongues (languages) and colors.” For the propo-
nents of tawqīf, the upshot of this verse was irrefutable: the diversity 
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of these languages is enumerated among the bounties and blessings 
bestowed by God upon humanity, providing further proof of the pre-
ponderance of the doctrine of tawqīf. But ʿAbd al-Jabbār retorts that 
some argue that the verse in question places God as the inventor of 
human speech. Dismissing this view, he claims that the verse did 
not intimate a divine role in the inception of languages, but rather 
it was concerned with the characteristics of the anatomy of tongues 
(ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1969:553–4). His clarification of this verse in a way 
which supports iṣṭilāḥ is somewhat contrived but it is also indicative of 
the weight attached to countering traditional proofs. Scholarship from 
subsequent periods did speak of there being a contradiction of scrip-
tural evidences germane to the two doctrines on the origin of languages; 
however, in the periods when the debate of the subject was at its most 
intense, it is evident that the scriptural evidence was viewed as favoring 
tawqīf. A link had been created with the identity as well as the authority 
of the pious ancestors, making the case for the doctrine positively unas-
sailable (Assmann 2006:73).
Grammarians and philologists: contributions to the discourse
While many of the aforementioned discussions on the origin of lan-
guage have been predominantly gleaned from the works of theologians, 
it was in the literature of the Arabic grammarians, a number of whom 
were of Muʿtazilite persuasion, that further analysis of the topic ensued. 
In a work devoted to a linguistic synthesis of the elements of the Arabic 
language, Ibn Jinnī (d. 1002), a grammarian of well-known Muʿtazilite 
leanings, includes a section on the origin of language. Ibn Jinnī does 
preface his remarks on the subject by stating that it is a topic which calls 
for prudent deliberation, although he adds that most of the ahl al-naẓar 
(“exponents of speculative theology”), whom we can take to mean the 
Muʿtazilites, were of the view that the origin of language lay in tawād ̣uʿ 
(common agreement) and iṣṭilāḥ and not waḥy (revelation) or tawqīf 
(Ibn Jinnī 1952:I, 40–9). He then comments that his revered mentor, 
Abū ʿAlī al-Fārisī (d. 987), a distinguished Muʿtazilite grammarian, 
actually admitted that language was “from God” (tawqīf ), citing Q 2:31, 
“And indeed God taught Ādam the names (asmāʾ) of all things.” Ibn 
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Jinnī does interject that one could infer from the verse that God empow-
ered Ādam to establish language and that this was an additional view 
that even al-Fārisī professed in some of his discussions on the subject, 
as did the philologist Abū ʾl-Hạsan al-Akhfash al-Aṣghar (d. 927). Ibn 
Jinnī then proceeds to offer a traditional explanation of the Qurʾanic 
verse in which it is stated that God taught to Ādam the names of all 
things created in all languages and that he and his offspring had spoken 
these languages. Ibn Jinnī goes on to state that consequently, as the 
offspring of Ādam dispersed throughout the world, they eventually 
adopted a particular language from among those original languages; the 
remainder of which became extinct. Ibn Jinnī insists that if authenti-
cated reports affirm such a view, then it was incumbent to accept 
and believe in them, yielding to their import (Ibn Jinnī 1952:I, 41; 
cf. Kopf 1956:34–6).
Ibn Jinnī then sets out the theoretical thrust of the counter-position 
of muwāḍaʿa, explaining how interlocutors would create connections 
between words and meanings by way of gesticulation; he explains they 
would point to one of the sons of Ādam and repeat themselves saying, 
“man, man, man” (insān). Interlocutors would progress through lan-
guage in this way, defining in the process nouns, verbs, and particles. 
According to this view, a blueprint of muwāḍaʿa could then form the 
basis for different lexical codes, as selected words were assigned equiva-
lences in other languages. The key prerequisite for all this was the exis-
tence of a language initially established through muwāḍaʿa. Ibn Jinnī 
asserts that as far as the proponents of muwāḍaʿa are concerned, it was 
improper to suggest that God could be the agent of positing due to the 
corporeal movement associated with gesticulation, which was an act 
imperative to the process of naming; this is because God has no physi-
cal organ ( jāriḥa). But it is speculated that God could transpose and 
transfer the use of established conventions, but again this would require 
the existence of an established language in the first place. Interestingly, 
Ibn Jinnī proposes a solution to the predicament: was it not possible for 
God to create a sound in an entity or body which would then be used 
to identify and characterize that entity? He even points out that God 
would not need to repeat himself ! Such an explanation would obviate 
the need for acts of physical gesticulation on the part of God. There appears 
to have been little enthusiasm for his suggestion as he explains that it 
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was recognized as being merely possible. An alternative explanation for 
the origin of language is mentioned by Ibn Jinnī and it seems to be 
related to the naturalist thesis referred to in Plato’s Cratylus, a dialogue 
which deals with the correctness of names and naming (Lepschy 
1994:15–29; Versteegh 1997:108). In the Greek philosophical setting 
the terms phúsis (φύσις) and thésis (θέσις) are respectively identified 
with naturalist and conventionalist perspectives. The former term pred-
icates a natural affinity between words and meanings while, in contrast, 
thésis signifies that the connection between the two was purely arbi-
trary. The ensuing arguments hinged upon the nature of the relation-
ship between words and their meanings within a broader context of 
nature and law, while in the Islamic context, the issue turns on the 
identification of the original designator of language. The Muʿtazilite 
theologian ʿAbbād ibn Sulaymān championed the naturalist thesis and 
it is referred to by Ibn Jinnī as being a sound perspective. ʿAbbād is 
reported to have spoken of a natural affinity between the collective 
phonemic constitution of words and their signified meanings to the 
extent that this intrinsic relationship determined the whole process of 
muwāḍaʿa. In one example ʿAbbād is asked what the Persian word for 
rock conjures up? He replies, “I find in (the word) connotations of arid-
ity and solidity; I believe it to be a rock” (Suyūṭī 1970:I, 47). The objec-
tion to this thesis was simple: if such a natural affinity existed, then all 
languages would be spontaneously understood by each and everyone. 
Abū Rashīd al-Naysābūrī reports that ʿAbbād argued that changing the 
name of an entity leads to a change in its character and that his Basran 
cohorts deemed him asinine for his views (Naysābūrī 1979:161). Gram-
marians as early as al-Khalīl ibn Ah ̣mad were fascinated by forms of 
onomatopoeia as were later Basran luminaries (cf. Ibn Taymiyya 
1961:418). Even Ibn Jinnī refined a theory of etymology (ishtiqāq) 
which was based around a common meaning intrinsic to the radicals of 
a particular verbal root and its permutations, a topic he expounds upon 
at length in this work (Ibn Jinnī 1952:II, 133–9).
Ibn Jinnī does not discuss the theological arguments about religious 
obligations and prerequisites; nor is there any reference to the debate 
about the use of analogical reasoning in respect of the divine names. 
The conspicuous absence of allusions to such themes would appear to 
indicate that the arguments on the issues were still evolving. The only 
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theological aspect of the debate touched upon in Ibn Jinnī’s work relates 
to muwāḍaʿa and its being linked with evident acts of gesticulation 
which would have crude anthropomorphic implications. Finally, having 
scrutinized the various theses on the origin of language, Ibn Jinnī 
explains that his reflections and deliberations on the subject over a con-
siderable period of time together with the authenticated scriptural evi-
dences had led him to conclude that it (language) was “from God 
Almighty” and that in his soul the belief that it was revealed via tawqīf 
had been strengthened. This admission would seem to confirm the 
measure of success achieved by the proponents of tawqīf as they were 
able to present their doctrine as one of the touchstones of orthodoxy by 
virtue of anchoring it to the exegetical statements of the pious ances-
tors. Their memory and standing would assist in securing authority for 
tawqīf, which could then be used as an effective counter-argument 
against iṣṭilāḥ and the panoply of theological doctrines for which it was 
exploited. Ibn Jinnī was, of course, a contemporary of ʿAbd al-Jabbār 
and sympathetic to the views of his Muʿtazilite peers. Other grammar-
ians held similar views (Loucel 1963:275). It is the case that theological 
and legal sources from the 10th/11th centuries reveal that scholarship 
was moving towards a position of neutrality (waqf ) on the subject. 
However, for those of a stern religiosity, to speak of anyone other than 
God as the establisher (wāḍiʿ) of language was tantamount to disbelief 
(Ibn Ḥazm 1985:V, 137). Such an attitude would ensure the enduring 
legacy of tawqīf, for despite the suggestion that the proponents of isṭịlāh ̣ 
eventually prevailed, many of the arguments for which it was invoked 
were passionately denounced (Versteegh 1996b:27). Furthermore, the 
concept of tawqīf had served as a potent weapon in the defense of 
orthodoxy yet it could still be unleashed by a process of restoration, 
making it seemingly a timeless construct. Indeed, those individuals 
who opposed the theory of metaphor on theological grounds were soon 
invoking tawqīf as one of the arguments in the refutations they set out.
One of the staunchest defenses of tawqīf was probably mounted by 
the Kufan grammarian Ibn Fāris (d. 1005). This was presented in a text 
devoted to examining selected linguistic features and conventions of 
the language of Arabic. Ironically, the work was dutifully dedicated to 
al-Sạ̄ḥib ibn ʿAbbād (d. 995), a wazir of Muʿtazilite inclinations who 
appointed ʿAbd al-Jabbār as the state’s jurisconsult. The work was produced 
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in an historical period in which the Buwayhids, a Shiʿite dynasty, were 
in the political ascendancy. The text begins with a section on tawqīf and 
iṣṭilāḥ which is prefaced by Ibn Fāris with his profession that “the lan-
guage of the Arabs (is based on) tawqīf.” As proof of this, the locus clas-
sicus of tawqīf, Q 2:31, together with a selection of glosses by leading 
Companion figures is cited. Ibn Fāris endorses the explication of this 
verse typically associated with Ibn ʿAbbās: namely that God taught 
Ādam the names of all created things (Ibn Fāris n.d.:7). Ibn Fāris deals 
with one objection raised by the opponents of tawqīf relating to the fact 
that the Qurʾanic verse states “and then he showed them to the angels,” 
in which the pronoun for animate objects is employed, apparently 
betraying a restrictive element to the compass of names taught by God 
to Ādam. This phenomenon was explained by reference to the conven-
tion known as taghlīb (“predominance”): there was nothing restrictive 
about the use of this pronoun, because, having brought together all of 
creation, that which was animate predominated over that which was 
not and therefore the pronoun used for the former was applied. 
Continuing with his emphatic endorsement of tawqīf, Ibn Fāris 
states that if someone were to ask whether the nouns for sabre (sayf ), 
sword (ḥusām), scimitar (ʿaḍb), and other terms had their origins in 
tawqīf and that none of these nouns was conventionally agreed upon, 
“We would say indeed that is our belief.” To back this up he uses an 
argument of citation (iḥtijāj). This centers on the notion that disputes 
concerning language usage and conventions are often settled by com-
mon agreement through recourse to earlier philological conventions 
and poetic precedents. Ibn Fāris then states that if language were estab-
lished via muwāḍaʿa and iṣṭilāḥ, then the resort to ih ̣tijāj, adducing 
these older forms of usage would be no more authoritative than ih ̣tijāj 
sourced to commonly agreed forms of usage established presently by 
one’s contemporaries. The point made here is that the prestige and 
authority commanded by older forms of usage seemingly determined 
via tawqīf would be invalid; yet conventions in terms of deference to 
precedents show that the reverse is true. Within Ibn Fāris’s conception 
of tawqīf, scant attention is paid to refuting the theoretical arguments 
adduced by the proponents of iṣṭilāḥ, but rather the focus is deliberately 
placed upon highlighting the authority of traditional proofs endorsed 
through reference to the memory of the pious ancestors (salaf ). Ibn 
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Fāris makes an audacious claim that Arabic orthography, grammar, and 
the science of prosody owed their origins to tawqīf, remarking that 
although conventional histories had associated their invention with 
notable scholars, such individuals had merely revived ancient disci-
plines of learning which had hitherto perished in time. 
 Ibn Fāris was an unquestionable defender of tawqīf, although it 
is fair to say that much of his theology seems informed by traditional 
Sunni orthodoxy. Abū ʿ Alī al-Fārisī, Ibn Jinnī, and al-Akhfash al-Aṣghar 
were all of Muʿtazilite persuasion, yet they were more than prepared to 
endorse tawqīf, despite their being ideologically close to the Basran 
Muʿtazilites. Moreover, during the same historical periods, Ashʿarite 
theologians and lawyers were now adopting a less hostile attitude to 
iṣṭilāḥ. Theories abounded fusing the two principal theses on the origin 
of language, such as the one propounded by the Shafiʿite scholar 
Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 1027) who championed the idea that God 
revealed a mandatory portion of language which enabled the process of 
iṣṭilāḥ to proceed. Other distinguished theologians such as Abū Bakr 
al-Bāqillānī sanctioned a non-committal approach (Asnawī 1999:I, 
190). The position taken by Muʿtazilite grammarians in respect of the 
doctrine of tawqīf would seem to contradict the idea that during the 
course of the 9th century and beyond there existed a tension between 
orthodoxy and arch-rationalists on the issue. But the grammarians 
appear as exceptions in this regard. Their inclination to tawqīf was 
influenced by the fact that they were utterly enthralled and captivated 
by the language whose virtues and features they had spent a lifetime 
poring over and extolling. Placing that language on the plane of tawqīf 
was inevitable; it provided a means of conceptually accentuating the 
inimitability of the language in which the sacred text had been revealed. 
One sensitive issue raised by scholars such as Richard Frank and Kees 
Versteegh relates to the fact that the discussion of the origin of language 
did not receive much sedate reflection in the works of the Arabic lin-
guists. It is linguistic literature from the late 10th century in which the 
topic is first reviewed. Frank sees the subject area as being inspired by 
theological considerations and hence its appearing in the works of the 
ahl al-kalām (proponents of speculative theology) (Frank 1978:29). 
Versteegh takes the view that within the Islamic tradition such a subject 
was not considered paramount because a synchronic view of language 
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prevailed among linguists. Scholars were concerned only in engaging 
with the revered language in which their sacred texts were revealed, a 
text they believed to have been preserved over the years by divine decree. 
They were purely interested in the applied linguistic aspects of scholar-
ship in respect of that language, which to them was a statically pre-
served phenomenon (Versteegh 1996b:16–19; Weiss 1987:343). It has 
further been suggested that following the political demise of the 
Muʿtazilites, many of the movement’s chief proponents took refuge in 
the vocations of law and, indeed, grammar, within which they were 
able to pursue their interests, influencing the discourse and ideas gener-
ated within these disciplines (Makdisi 1984:16; Versteegh 1996a:592). 
Whether this state of affairs helped precipitate the move to a position 
of neutrality (waqf ) on the issue of the origin of language is debatable. 
One notes that despite the deference to tawqīf among grammarians, 
elaborate philological theories which they developed did contradict the 
underlying gist of the theory. However, they continued to maintain an 
allegiance to the thesis; despite the fact that tawqīf  had not always been 
a distinction of religious orthodoxy, it was generated in the attempts to 
counter theological innovation by appealing to the exegetical musings 
of the pious ancestors (Shah 2000:60). It is worth mentioning the 
apparent linkage between iṣṭilāḥ and the doctrine of a created Qurʾān. 
It has been claimed that isṭịlāh ̣was ideally suited to undermine the doc-
trine of an uncreated Qurʾān (Weiss 1974:38; Carter 1983:68; Versteegh 
1996b:25; Vasalou 2009:204–5) and that there was likewise an affinity 
between the orthodox doctrine of an uncreated Qurʾān and the espousal 
of tawqīf. However, within the body of classical literature such linkage 
appears to be of marginal importance to the main protagonists and 
therefore unlikely to have been a driving factor in the ensuing debates. 
Renaissance of tawqīf 
In a treatise devoted to a refutation of the incidence of metaphor in the 
language of Arabic, the medieval theologian and Hanbalite scholar Ibn 
Taymiyya (d. 1328) includes references to the doctrines of tawqīf and 
iṣṭilāḥ, referring to the fact that these two theses gained ascendancy in 
classical Muslim discourse on the origins of language. Ibn Taymiyya 
  M. Shah / Numen 58 (2011) 314–343 335
emphasized that iṣṭilāḥ was a detrimental innovation, explaining that 
the first individual to profess it was Abū Hāshim. Ibn Taymiyya explains 
that both al-Ashʿarī and Abū Hāshim had been students of al-Jubbāʾī, 
but that al-Ashʿarī had subsequently denounced the Muʿtazilites and 
their major theological doctrines (Ibn Taymiyya 1983:82). He com-
ments that the two students disputed over the issue of the origin of 
languages (mabdaʾ al-lughāt): Abū Hāshim stated that language was the 
product of iṣṭilāḥ while al-Ashʿarī responded that it was established 
through tawqīf. Ibn Taymiyya observes that in later medieval periods 
scholars continued to debate the subject with some individuals arguing 
that the origin of language could be attributed to combined measures 
of both tawqīf and iṣṭilāḥ, reporting that many scholars adopted a posi-
tion of neutrality (waqf ) on the issue. His reference to tawqīf and iṣṭilāh ̣ 
is broached as part of his wider critique of the concept of metaphor 
or trope (majāz), which was rejected by certain theologians (Ghazālī 
1971:74). Rational theologians were making frequent references to 
metaphors in order to obviate the anthropomorphic imagery presented 
by sensitive scriptural dicta (Heinrichs 1992:256–7).
The brand of conservative theology to which Ibn Taymiyya sub-
scribed maintained that this resort to metaphor was an insidious attempt 
to promulgate heretical doctrines. Thus, in instances where there were 
Qurʾanic verses referring to God’s face or hands, applying metaphor 
would render the former as being a reference to His essence, while the 
latter would be interpreted as divine grace; consequently, the device of 
metaphor permitted the circumvention of the literal language of scrip-
ture. Additionally, lexical evidence in the form of loci probantes could be 
readily adduced to show that such explanations were consistent with 
the ancient usage of the Arabs. For the conservatives, while accepting 
the need to differentiate between divine and human dimensions of 
attributes and traits, it was deemed improper to explain away references 
to God in this way. Ibn Taymiyya was of the view that such instances 
had to be accepted bi-lā kayf (“without qualification”); namely, if God 
describes Himself as descending through the heavens, this descent 
should be accepted as defined in scripture without expressing a view 
about the precise nature of its modality. Those who argued that it was 
imperative to explain away the literal language in such instances would 
place such examples within the vector of majāz, stating that this was an 
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example of God’s “mercy” descending through the heavens.5 Sensing 
the potency of the device of metaphor in the service of speculative theo-
logians such as the Muʿtazilites and others, Ibn Taymiyya set out to 
demolish conceptually the idea that metaphor was a feature of the 
Arabic idiom and the conspicuous reference to the doctrine of tawqīf 
provided a subtle means of insinuating not only that there was an inno-
vative quality to iṣṭilāḥ, but also that configured around it was an array 
of theologically contentious notions. By a process of renaissance tawqīf 
was again made relevant. 
Although there has been a tendency to identify Ibn Taymiyya with a 
rigorous interpretation of tawqīf, and one which is typical of the con-
servatism with which he is often associated (Weiss 1974:40), his expli-
cation of tawqīf is hardly as strict as the emphatic endorsement of tawqīf 
defined by Ibn Fāris. One needs to bear in mind that the aim of Ibn 
Taymiyya’s disquisition on metaphor was to attack the use of majāz as 
a theological instrument and, in the doctrine of tawqīf, he found a 
convenient accessory for his arguments. Rhetoricians divided words 
into ḥaqīqa (“veridical”) and majāz (“metaphorical” or “figurative”) 
senses; the former applied when a word’s usage was consistent with its 
primarily assigned meaning. The technical definition of a metaphor was 
a word or phrase which was used in a secondary sense other than its 
primary one; the term majāz conjures up the image of transfer or move-
ment from one meaning to a second one and it is likewise exemplified 
by instances of borrowing (istiʿāra). Hence, if one were talking about a 
lion in its ḥaqīqa sense, then this would be a reference to the tawny 
colored predator that belongs to the family of cats known for their 
ferociousness; conversely, if one were using the term in its majāz sense, 
then it would be the qualities of courageousness and valor that were 
intended (Abū ʾl-Hụsayn al-Baṣrī 1991:12).
Ibn Taymiyya’s reasoning is that, while the semantic compass of such 
terms was wholly valid, it was not necessary to construct a hạqīqa-majāz 
division to determine such meanings; he proposed that the division of 
words and expressions into ḥaqīqa and majāz classes was a later devel-
opment which owed its origins to the activities of groups such as the 
5) This would be classed as exemplifying majāz al-hạdhf (an elliptical metaphor): ‘mercy’ 
is the elided element which obviates the anthropomorphic sense of the expression. 
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Muʿtazila and that there were ulterior motives driving the associated 
discourse. The general thrust of Ibn Taymiyya’s critique rested on his 
chipping away at the theoretical edifice constructed to define majāz and 
ḥaqīqa through reference to primary and secondary cycles of posited 
meanings which were technically connected with muwāḍaʿa. Appealing 
to the authority of precedent, he maintains that among the pious ances-
tors no specific reference to these terms is found in the technical sense 
of metaphorical or veridical usage; thus although some scholars such as 
Abū ʿ Ubayda (d. 825) and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) actually utilized 
the term majāz, they were not referring to metaphor but rather a rudi-
mentary tool of linguistic interpretation and analysis (cf. Heinrichs 
1984:122–5). The contention that majāz was not a feature of the 
Qurʾān or, indeed, the Arabic language was principally propounded 
by scholars associated with the Ẓāhirī tradition, a theological move-
ment which also condemned the use of analogical reasoning in all reli-
gious matters (Asnawī 1999:1.302).6 Interestingly, many of those who 
rejected iṣṭilāḥ, such as Ibn Khuwazmandād, were actually opponents 
of the concept of metaphor. It is also the case that philological concepts 
discussing the incidence of synonyms (tarāduf ), homonyms (ishtirāk), 
antonyms (aḍdād ), and etymology (ishtiqāq) in the language of Arabic 
were vehemently opposed by some defenders of tawqīf. They were of 
the view that these concepts per se presupposed a deficiency or inherent 
flaw in the design of language. 
Having spent some time outlining the standard definitions of majāz 
and ḥaqīqa, the point is made that such definitions presupposed an 
acute awareness of the stages of positing meaning and the “givenness” 
of language. It suggests that a word was first used for one meaning 
before being transferred to another. Ibn Taymiyya presents the argu-
ment that such a view would be in accordance with the beliefs of those 
who professed that languages were based on iṣṭilāh ̣: namely, that a group 
of intelligent individuals came together and commonly agreed upon 
the designation of words and meanings, applying them to all languages; 
this, in his estimation, was a view no one before Abū Hāshim actually 
6) Dāwūd b. Khalaf al-Zạ̄hirī (d. 883) is the founder of this movement and his 
son Abū Bakr b. Dāwūd al-Is ̣fahānī rejected that majāz featured in the Qurʾān or 
the traditions. 
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held. Ibn Taymiyya protests that it is impossible to state categorically 
that people actually came together and assigned all the lexical items 
found in all languages with their posited meanings before actually using 
them. His conclusion is that all one can ascertain, in the sense of broad 
authentication, is that certain words are employed (istiʿmāl ) for speci-
fied meanings and nothing else (Ibn Taymiyya 1983:82–6).
Ibn Taymiyya seems to accommodate a greater measure of flexibility 
in explaining the historical evolution of language for he recognizes that 
a rigidly formulated doctrine of tawqīf could never be fully substanti-
ated through reference to the scriptural sources. Thus, in many ways, 
his critique of iṣṭilāḥ rests upon underscoring its innovative texture. He 
does see tawqīf as being emblematic of a divinely inspirational dynamic 
which accounts for both the establishment of language and its subse-
quent acquisition. He even uses the Arabic word ilhām (“inspiration”) 
alongside tawqīf to highlight this process. Within such an interpreta-
tion, the notion that iṣṭilāḥ, together with its concomitant phases of 
muwāḍaʿa, serves as the sine qua non for the use of language is rendered 
redundant. Nonetheless, the inference is not that all languages are 
traced back to Ādam but rather that humans were imbued with an 
innate capacity to express and communicate desires and thoughts 
through the medium of words, adding that ilhām sufficiently explains 
the ability to articulate language without pre-existing muwāḍaʿa; in 
essence, this explanation is the embodiment of his thesis of tawqīf (Ibn 
Taymiyya 1983:86).
The critique of majāz outlined by Ibn Taymiyya was taken up with 
alacrity by his loyal student Ibn Qayyim (d. 1350). Prominent in his 
treatment of this subject is the view that the majority of scholars 
(al-jumhūr) were of the belief that language was revealed via tawqīf 
(Ibn Qayyim 1990:233); the reference to this doctrine’s having been 
the preferred dogma of the pious ancestors formed one of the first 
structured phases of his critique of majāz. Ibn Qayyim was not con-
cerned with launching into an energetic defense of the revelationist 
view of language, but, like his mentor, his focus was upon dismissing 
the possibility that one could unravel successive cycles of convention-
ally positing words with meaning. What is striking about Ibn Qayyim’s 
treatment of the topic is not only his marshalling of all the technical 
arguments for and against majāz together with the theological import 
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of the discussions, but also his reference to the theory of majāz being an 
innovation which occurred after the (preferred) first three centuries of 
the Islamic tradition. He is naturally alluding to the Prophetic utter-
ance in which mention is made of the finest of centuries being the one 
in which the Prophet lived followed by the two ensuing centuries. The 
inference is that the authenticated precedents, beliefs, and practices 
defined in these select periods are authoritative and even sacrosanct. 
Given their historical genesis and provenance, neither majāz nor iṣṭilāh ̣ 
could claim this coveted status; conversely, the thesis of tawqīf enjoyed 
the imprimatur of community consensus (Ibn Qayyim 1990:233). In 
this sense the hierarchy of authority created by reference to the identity 
of the pious ancestors provided critical leverage for tawqīf and Ibn 
Qayyim could build on this before commencing with the theoretical 
case against majāz. 
Conclusions
In the context of the classical articulation of orthodox Islam, the nor-
mative practices and beliefs of the faith were ultimately anchored to 
and informed by a synthesis of Qurʾanic and Prophetic paradigms. 
Within this hierarchy of authority, apposite importance was attached to 
the teachings and musings of the pious ancestors, namely, those indi-
viduals who were either Companion figures or individuals among later 
generations of adherents of the faith. Certainly, within the realm of 
speculative theology many of the arguments and points of dispute were 
the product of dialectical discussions and postulates; yet, where possi-
ble, it was still relevant to seek a point of reference or support for such 
ruminations in the traditional sources. The so-called adillat al-samʿ 
(“proofs from the authenticated corpuses of scripture”) were the desid-
eratum for the resolution of theological quandaries, although groups 
with conflicting ideologies would resort to interpreting such proofs in 
a manner commensurate with their preconceived views. This is certainly 
the case for the history of arguments about the origin of language. The 
thesis of iṣṭilāḥ served as a platform for theologically contentious doc-
trines, including arguments about the imposition of religious and moral 
obligations, the nature of the divine names and attributes, the employment 
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of metaphor, and, in the view of some, the doctrine of a created Qurʾān. 
The developed doctrine of tawqīf was made authoritative by its being 
seemingly cast through a reconstruction of the past and presented as a 
distinction of orthodoxy; the accentuation, explication, and contextu-
alization of general scriptural evidences made this reconstruction of the 
past possible. The less stringent attitude adopted by many theologians 
to the espousal of either the concept of tawqīf or iṣṭilāh ̣ did not dimin-
ish the orthodox pedigree of the former doctrine in terms of its being 
reminiscent of the memory of the pious ancestors. Moreover, that the 
thesis of tawqīf was invoked when needed as an emblem of traditional 
orthodoxy, no more so than in the discussions on the incidence of met-
aphor in the language of Arabic, would seem to underline the role that 
referencing to the past and the processes of generation historically 
played in the defense of orthodoxy.
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Abū ʾl-Hụsayn al-Baṣrī, Muh ̣ammad b. ʿAlī. 1991. al-Muʿtamad fi uṣūl al-fiqh, 5 vols., 
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Leiden: E.J. Brill.
  M. Shah / Numen 58 (2011) 314–343 343
Shah, Mustafa. 2000. “The Philological Endeavours of the Early Arabic Linguists: 
Theological Implications of the tawqīf-iṣṭilāh ̣ Antithesis and the majāz Contro-
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